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Scandals in corporate finance in the early 2000s and subsequent policy changes led corporate executives to adopt a 
more risk-based approach in corporate governance. Therefore, identification and assessment of risks became 
extremely important. Risk assessment poses a particular challenge for auditors due to the highly complex structure 
and processes of internal control systems. Extant research in this area mostly focused on probabilistic models and 
expert systems that capture and model heuristic knowledge. However, evidence suggests that knowledge of the 
structure of the internal control system is also essential. There is relatively little research that focuses on the 
modeling of the structural aspects of financial processes and their internal control systems as a means of helping 
corporate executives and auditors perform their respective tasks of risk management and assessment. This article 
proposes an approach to risk management and assessment in internal control systems that models the structure 
and financial processes of an internal control system. The model uses a directed graph to represent the various 
elements in an internal control system, such as financial statement assertions, control activities, financial processes, 
and the causal relationships that exist among these elements. The article demonstrates the usefulness of the model 
by presenting and discussing algorithms based on this model to help corporate executives manage risk and to help 
internal and external auditors assess risk, for designing substantive testing and for tracing sources of errors. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Scandals in corporate finance in the early 2000s and the subsequent policy changes required managers to adopt a 
more risk-based approach in corporate governance. Therefore, risk management and assessment of risks for the 
audit function became extremely important in this context. Risk management tasks pose a particular challenge for 
managers, as does risk assessment for auditors, because of the highly complex structure and processes of internal 
control systems [Davis, Massey, and Lovell, 1997; Felix and Niles, 1988; Krishnan, Peters, Padman, and Kaplan,  
2005; Wand and Weber, 1989]. Pressures are also mounting for both internal and external auditors to perform their 
tasks more effectively and efficiently [Curtis and Payne, 2008]. The combination of increasing complexity of the 
information processing environment and the mounting pressure for efficiency and effectiveness provided the impetus 
and the advice for managers and auditors to switch from a process-oriented approach to a risk-based approach 
[McNamee and Selim, 1999; Weidenmier and Ramamoorti, 2006]. The importance of risk management is also 
evidenced by the establishment of policies and frameworks by professional organizations, such as the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (COSO), to ensure a more 
formal approach to risk management. For example, COSO released the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
framework to serve as guidelines for reliable reporting and regulatory compliance. 
To effectively and efficiently perform risk management and risk assessment, tools and techniques could help 
navigate the complex internal control environment and help make decisions regarding risk levels [Denna, Hansen, 
and Meservy, 1991]. Most of the existing research in this area has focused on probabilistic models and expert 
systems [Bodnar, 1975; Kelly, 1985; Lenard, Alam, Booth, and Madeyet, 2001; Looi, Tan, Teow, and Chan, 1989; 
Meservy, Bailey, and Johnson, 1986; O’Donnell, Arnold, and Sutton, 2000; Srivastava and Shafer, 1992]. Though 
probabilistic and heuristic knowledge is important, evidence suggests that knowledge of the structure of the internal 
control system is also important [Frederick, 1991]. However, relatively little research focuses on the modeling of the 
structural aspects of internal control systems as a means to assist in managing and assessing risk. This article 
proposes an approach to modeling internal control systems by focusing on the representation of the structural 
aspects of internal control systems. The proposed model consists of two parts. The first part is the modeling of the 
financial processing structure of an internal control system as a directed graph, and the second part defines the 
reasoning processes that can be used to manage and assess risk. The directed graph-based model represents the 
various elements in a financial processing system, such as financial statements assertions, control activities, 
financial operations, and causal relationships that exist among the elements. Algorithms that help external auditors 
in diagnosing weaknesses to plan substantive testing and help management in evaluation of the system 
demonstrate the utility of the proposed model. When a financial operation fails or misstatement occurs, it may not 
manifest itself immediately. The problem may be detected downstream in the transaction flow. During tests of 
controls, corporate personnel and external auditors may follow the path forward to find vulnerable financial 
assertions. And, during substantive testing, an auditor may need to backtrack the complex internal control system to 
locate the source of the problem. The first algorithm helps managers and auditors assess the potential impact of a 
weak control or financial operation. The second algorithm helps auditors navigate the complex structure of an 
internal control system by reducing the search space during substantive testing. 
The purpose of this article is to introduce a methodology to improve auditors’ ability to provide assurance to the 
public of the reliability of a company’s financial statements as representing the company’s financial position and 
results of operations. Auditors are currently required to assess a company’s internal control system before 
conducting the substantive examination of the company’s records. The more that auditors may rely on their clients’ 
controls, the more efficient the audit, since the nature and extent of the substantive examination may be reduced. 
Clients want a more efficient (less intrusive and costly) audit, while the public increasingly demands a more thorough 
and effective audit. 
Our article thus presents a new modeling approach for internal control systems auditors may utilize without greatly 
increasing their time allocation to control assessment, but which will more expeditiously connect weaknesses to 
vulnerabilities in financial statements. Implemented, this model will improve auditors’ ability to budget valuable 
auditing time to areas that are more vulnerable to misstatements, while also speeding the auditors’ ability to trace 
errors back to weak controls, especially with large and complex companies. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief description of the internal control 
system environment, i.e., its risks, its management, and its assessment. A review of relevant literature follows in 
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Section III. Section IV introduces the proposed model and algorithms for risk management in internal control 
systems. Finally, Section V provides conclusions and discusses future research directions. 
II. ASSESSMENT OF RISK IN INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
When accounting scandals (and so-called “audit failures”) led to the 2002 Justice Department prosecution of 
corporate executives, the destruction of the previously venerable Arthur Andersen accounting firm, and the 
enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), attention to internal controls reached a new peak, while confidence in 
published financial statements plummeted. Among its provisions, SOX Section 302 required the corporate CEO and 
CFO in public filings to acknowledge their responsibility for establishing and maintaining internal controls and to 
report on the current operational effectiveness of the corporation’s internal control system. Any material control 
weaknesses had to be publicly disclosed. Section 404 then required auditors to perform and report their own 
evaluation of the system of controls. 
An audit is essentially an engagement in which the auditor examines and evaluates evidence about a set of 
management assertions (i.e., the components of the financial statements) and then issues a report attesting to the 
degree of correspondence between those assertions and established criteria (usually, generally accepted 
accounting principles, or GAAP). Each of those assertions by management contends that the amount is neither 
materially overstated nor understated, and that it is valued fairly. The strengths of the controls in the accounting 
information system (AIS) support these assertions. 
An audit requires substantive testing of the account balances and the transactions which created those balances. 
Usually, statistical sampling is applied to select transactions for examination, resulting in reasonable (rather than 
absolute, prohibitively expensive) assurance. The degree and amount of substantive testing can be reduced if the 
internal control system can be relied upon. Thus, it is efficient to perform tests of controls before substantive testing 
in order to identify areas containing control weaknesses. Tests of the operation of controls may involve the entry of 
dummy transactions with deliberate errors in order to ascertain the operational effectiveness of the control 
procedures in transaction processing operations. The financial assertions affected by operations found to be poorly 
controlled would be more vulnerable to misstatement and, therefore, should be subjected to more extensive, time-
consuming, substantive testing by auditors. 
There are standard many-to-many relationships between financial statement assertions and transaction processing 
operations, and there are standard many-to-many relationships between transaction processing operations and 
control procedures. But these standard relationships, linking a control procedure through a complex network of 
operations to an assertion, may vary from one company to the next. The greater the comprehension of these 
linkages, the more effective and efficient will be the evaluation of controls. 
With little specific guidance in SOX or from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and an atmosphere of 
excessive caution within the audit community, managers and auditors preferred to err on the side of effectiveness in 
their examination of internal controls rather than efficiency, identifying and testing nearly every control. As a result, 
some large corporations endured a tripling of audit fees on top of large new internal costs. 
To constrain excessive management and audit costs, with their disproportional impact on smaller companies 
(scalability), while preserving SOX’s fundamental objectives, the SEC and its Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) in 2005 launched a process to concentrate audits on areas of greatest risk, those areas most likely 
to result in a material misstatement in the financial assertions. This process resulted in the 2007 publication of 
Auditing Standard No. 5, “An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated with an Audit of 
Financial Statements.” 
Thus Auditing Standard No. 5 put more responsibility on the auditors’ judgment, directing auditors, as well as 
management, to use their professional judgment to determine the key controls―controls that mitigate potential 
misstatements. These are the controls that should be tested. As soon as auditors or managers are satisfied that a 
significant assertion has one (or more) well-designed and functioning control(s) in the network of financial operations 
leading to it so that its risk of material misstatement is reduced to a sufficiently low level, the controls of any other 
operations in that segment of the network do not need to be tested with respect to that assertion. The intention is to 
make audits more efficient (less costly) without reducing their effectiveness. 
III. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
From the description in the previous section it is apparent that auditors, and now enterprise executives, face a 
daunting task in balancing effectiveness and efficiency in managing and assessing risks. An early approach to 
model the audit knowledge and auditing processes uses probability and/or system reliability theory to model internal 
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control systems [Ahituv, Halpem, and Will, 1985: Bodnar, 1975; Cooley and Cooley, 1982; Cushing, 1974; Stratton, 
1981; Yu and Neter, 1973]. These models regard an internal control system as consisting of a set of controls, control 
procedures that monitor the controls, and error correction procedures. They describe the sequential ordering of 
control procedures and use probability estimates for procedure errors. The distinct features of this approach include 
systematic error description and use of explicit numeric output to assist auditors in decision making. Though this 
approach can provide a mathematically sound description of an internal control system, it failed to gain acceptance 
because of the high cost of collecting the needed probabilities, the need for reassessment of these probabilities as 
internal control systems change, and the simplifying assumptions [Felix and Niles, 1988]. For example, Bodnar 
[1975] notes that, although the simplifying assumption of statistical independence among controls may be 
necessary, research supports interdependence of behavioral variables (e.g., dominance by one employee in a 
group, predisposition of an employee toward collusion). 
Expert systems have also been proposed to assist auditors in planning and evaluating audit systems. Auditing often 
involves complex decision-making processes. The ability to make the right decision often requires years of 
experience and deep knowledge. Expert systems are a natural solution to codify human auditors’ expertise and 
experience. Examples include identification of risks, appraisal of controls, and planning/assessment of control and 
substantive tests [Hunton and Rose, 2010]. Audit research has a long and rich history of using artificial intelligence 
(AI)-based techniques [Bailey, Duke, Gerlach, Ko, Meservy, and Whinston, 1985; Baldwin, Brown, and Trinkle, 
2006; Changchit, 2003; Davis, Massey, and Lovell, 1997; Denna, Hansen, Meservy, and Wood, 1992; Gadh, 
Krishnan, and Peters, 1993; Kelly, 1985; Looi, Tan, Teow, and Chan, 1989]. A common weakness of expert systems 
is their lack of completeness in terms of covering the various aspects of an internal control system [Krishnan, Peters, 
Padman, and Kaplan, 2005]. In addition expert systems rely on the availability of expert knowledge and knowledge 
acquisition, both of which can be a hindrance to implementing expert systems. These systems have not lived up to 
their expectations [O’Leary, 2003]. However, the biggest weakness of expert systems lies in the fact that they tend 
to utilize only one of two important types of knowledge that auditors find useful when performing their tasks. In 
addition to traditional expert systems, artificial neural networks have also been used in audit-related tasks [Calderon 
and Cheh, 2002; Koskivaara, 2004]. Koskivaara criticizes the use of neural networks in auditor decision aids by 
stating one of their major weaknesses, i.e., the inability of such systems to trace the process by which the output is 
reached [Koskivaara, 2004]. Therefore, the results lack explanatory capabilities. 
A study by Frederick shows that auditors, in particular experienced auditors, used more knowledge of the structure 
of an internal control system, or knowledge of the various financial operations and their interconnectedness or 
relationships in a financial processing system [Frederick, 1991]. Transaction flow or the flow of accounting data is an 
important source of information for auditors [Frederick, 1991; Whittington and Pany, 2001]. Gadh, Krishnan, and 
Peters [1993] point to the need to combine structured knowledge and heuristic knowledge in modeling internal 
controls. As further evidence of the importance of structured knowledge use in auditing, empirical work indicates that 
flowcharts are part of auditors’ internal representation of internal control systems [Frederick, 1991; Kelly, 1985; 
Meservy, Bailey, and Johnson, 1986]. However, few papers focused on modeling this very important aspect of 
auditors’ extant knowledge of internal control systems [Bailey, Duke, Gerlach, Ko, Meservy, and Whinston, 1985; 
Krishnan, Peters, Padman, and Kaplan, 2005; Wand and Weber, 1989]. The structure of an internal control system 
can be defined by the financial operations or their information system implementations, control activities, financial 
statement assertions supported by control activities, and the information flow among the first three elements. Bailey, 
Duke, Gerlach, Ko, Meservy, and Whinston [1985] use biologic-directed graph to capture both control and data flows 
in their TICOM model. The TICOM model represents accounting operations and control activities as nodes in the 
graph and uses constraints sets to represent relationships among the nodes. Procedures based on TICOM allow 
auditors to perform more efficient evaluation of an internal control system for a client. Gadh, Krishnan, and Peters 
[1993] extend Bailey’s work by proposing a model that combines structural knowledge of internal controls with more 
heuristic knowledge of rules [Bailey, Duke, Gerlach, Ko, Meservy, and Whinston, 1985]. Wand and Weber propose 
an ontological model for accounting information systems to allow more efficient identification of controls affected by 
changes in the accounting information system [Wand and Weber, 1989]. Each component in the accounting 
information system is modeled as an entity (or “thing”) with properties. The relationships among the entities are 
defined by the accounting events through which the related entities affect each other. A hierarchy of subsystems is 
defined through these entities, the accounting events, and the relationships. Procedures are proposed and 
discussed, procedures that allow the search for the affected controls to be localized to subsystems affected by the 
changes in the accounting information systems. Krishnan, Peters, Padman, and Kaplan [2005] present a process-
oriented model for accounting information systems to help auditors make an effective and efficient selection of key 
controls for reliability assessment. The key components of the model include economic events, information 
transformation processes, control activities, and target error classes. Target error classes and the related controls 
and information transformation processes are modeled as a relation called covers. Procedures based on set-
covering algorithms are proposed for both key control selection and evaluation. 
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Common to all these models is the representation of the structural aspects of an internal control system. Because of 
the nature of economic transactions in an AIS, how information flows and how such flows are monitored through 
controls are very important to the assurance that the representations of the economic transactions are not materially 
misstated. The information flow in an internal control system, particularly the propagative nature of such flows, has 
been well recognized by researchers in the field [Ahituv, Halpern, and Will, 1985; Bailey, Duke, Gerlach, Ko, 
Meservy, and Whinston, 1985; Bodnar, 1975; Cushing, 1974; Krishnan, Peters, Padman, and Kaplan, 2005; Wand 
and Weber, 1989]. However, relatively little research focuses on this important aspect of modeling in internal control 
systems. This article proposes a model for the structural aspects of an internal control system using a directed graph 
to represent its financial operations. An important feature of the model is its ability to model the propagative flow of 
economic information through capturing the causal relationships among the elements of an internal control system. 
Directed graph-based modeling techniques in engineering contexts proved to be an effective tool for knowledge 
representation of a financial reporting system [Guan and Graham, 1994, 1996; Narayanan and Viswanhadam, 
1987]. The article also demonstrates how the model may be used to help managers and auditors in their new 
responsibility of selecting which controls to test and, moreover, to help auditors diagnose errors during substantive 
testing of an internal control system using an algorithm adapted from Guan and Graham [1994]. 
IV. A DIRECTED GRAPH REPRESENTATION OF A FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM 
This section describes a proposed model for internal control systems and presents algorithms for assisting in risk 
management and assessment. This approach to modeling the internal control system is motivated by the evidence 
that experienced auditors rely on knowledge of the structural aspects of the system and transaction flow within the 
system [Frederick, 1991] and the relative lack of research on models that assist auditors in utilizing this important 
knowledge component. 
Auditors are required to document a client’s control structure as proof for federal regulators and for use by the audit 
team. Economic events are captured by the AIS and then follow paths through a network of transaction processing 
operations, terminating with their effect on one or more financial statement assertions. Each operation, if not 
properly controlled, could introduce an error as it processes the data. Only through understanding these 
relationships can a testing plan be designed that is both effective enough to reduce the risk of material misstatement 
to an acceptable level, and efficient enough to keep the testing costs within reason. 
The higher the materiality and the inherent risk in an assertion, the greater the need for strong controls. Thus, the 
paths backward, from assertion to operations, is likewise invaluable for planning effective and efficient tests of the 
functioning of the controls surrounding those operations. 
The currently required documentation explains transactions flow from initiation, authorization, recording, processing, 
and reporting, along with the control procedures applied [Ramos, 2006]. “Walk-throughs” are recommended as the 
best way to confirm understanding of control design and operation [Ramos, 2006]. In a walk-through, the 
documenter follows a single transaction through its detailed procedures, making inquiries and gathering evidence. 
Thus, auditors already routinely gather and evaluate the inputs needed for the proposed model. The proposed 
model provides a formal representation to help auditors navigate the complex web of transaction flows to identify 
risks and help auditors locate weak controls that lead to misstatements. 
The proposed model formally represents the complex web of financial operations and their relations to assertions 
using a directed graph. This model allows an auditor to navigate both forward from operations to assertions and 
backwards from assertions to operations. In an internal control system, the controls are associated with operations. 
Thus the ability of an auditor to navigate easily an internal control system provides a tremendous advantage for both 
effectiveness and efficiency purposes. Though the controls are part of the proposed model, the main objective of the 
model is to assist the auditor to locate the financial operations whose controls are to be assessed. The interactions 
and interdependence of the financial processes are represented in the model from which, in conjunction with a 
commonly available list of expected controls for given operations such as shown in Table 1 for the example financial 
reporting system in Figure 1, the key controls and their interrelationships may be inferred. 
Modeling of Internal Control System 
The financial processing system, S, is defined as 
 },,,{ GOCAS   
where  
 A = set of financial statement assertions 
 C = set of controls/control activities 
 O = set of financial operations such as recording a disbursement. 
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Table 1: Financial Operations and Their Controls 
Financial Operations Associated Controls 
Receive customer Purchase 
Order and prepare job 
requirements for Operations & 
Trucking 
Order processed by authorized employee, properly trained, with password 
compatibility check 
Validity check on customer to approved customer list 
Credit check on customer’s current status and credit limit before accepting 
order. Any exceptions must be approved by Treasury function. 
Validity check on inventory SKUs 
Range/reasonableness check on inventory quantities 
Acknowledgement of order sent to customer 
Orders sequentially numbered to highlight any missing/unbilled orders 
Weigh trucks when empty Trucks weighed by authorized employee, with password compatibility check 
Recorded weight subject to range check for reasonableness, and preferably 
entered automatically from scale 
Accuracy of scale checked daily against standard weights 
Send to the bank any customer 
remittance payments erroneously 
sent directly to the company 
Incoming mail opened by two employees, who are bonded with theft 
insurance, working together in a room with a video camera 
All checks received immediately endorsed, “For deposit only into account 
9999” 
Remittance logged for subsequent comparison to bank’s list of customer 
remittance payments received 
Monthly statements sent to customers who can notify the company if a 
payment they sent is not shown on the statement 
If this is a custom job, create an 
internal manual Packing List 
List prepared by authorized employee, properly trained, with password 
compatibility check 
Validity check on inventory SKUs 
Range/reasonableness check on inventory quantities 
Weigh trucks when full Trucks weighed by authorized employee, with password compatibility check 
Recorded weight subject to range check for reasonableness, and preferably 
entered automatically from scale 
Automatic check of difference between full weight and empty weight for 
reasonableness 
Accuracy of scale checked daily against standard weights 
IF THIS IS A CUSTOM JOB, 
CREATE MORE DETAILED 
PRICED PACKING LIST 
List prepared by authorized employee, properly trained, with password 
compatibility check 
Validity check on inventory SKUs 
Range/reasonableness check on inventory quantities 
Range/reasonableness check on inventory prices 
Access secure bank website for 
list of customer remittance 
payments received. Record in Qb 
to reduce bank loan and 
Customer Ar. Report any non-
customer remittance to bank, to 
be treated as cash, and report 
customer payment discrepancies 
to manager 
Website accessed by authorized employee, properly trained, with password 
compatibility check 
Date-of-last-logon shown and consistent with authorized last logon 
List checked against log of remittance payments originally erroneously sent 
directly to company and forwarded to bank, for inclusion in list 
Amount check of payment against balance owed for reasonableness 
Date of payment (current date) automatically entered into QB by system 
AR total in QB before and after update confirmed to be reduced by total of 
remittance payments 
Monthly statements sent to customers as additional confirmation that 
payments have been properly credited 
Create Invoice in Qb. “Big Co.” is 
invoiced at only 90% of contract 
Invoice created by authorized employee, properly trained, with password 
compatibility check who has no access to inventory, cash, or credit approvals 
Standard prices retrieved automatically from price file rather than keyed in 
Discount for “Big Co.” calculated automatically 
Invoice products, quantities, and customer number compared for agreement 
against customer’s original purchase order 
Range/reasonableness check on total dollar amount of invoice 
QB updated automatically, based on invoices, for sales, AR, inventory, and 
cost of sales, with date of invoice (current date) automatically entered into QB 
by system 
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Table 1: Financial Operations and Their Controls – Continued 
Send weights to clerk Weights sent automatically, by authorized employee, properly trained, with 
password compatibility check 
Acknowledgement by clerk of weights received 
Receive Monthly Bank Statement, 
reconcile and record adjustments 
in Qb 
Bank statement received and reconciled by authorized employee, properly 
trained, and independent of previous processes involving cash 
Checks shown as outstanding for more than 30 days, and deposits shown as 
in transit for more than 2 days, are investigated 
Any bank charges are proved to be in accordance with contracts with bank 
Resulting reconciliation is reviewed by upper management 
Receive Final Output Melt Weight 
from “Big Co.” and record 
adjustments in Qb 
Range/reasonableness check on adjustment compared to weight originally 
invoiced 
Adjustments recorded by authorized employee, properly trained, with 
password compatibility check 
Create Bill of Lading for all jobs Bill of lading created by authorized employee, properly trained, with password 
compatibility check 
Bill of lading compared against customer’s original purchase order for 
products and amounts, and against weights previously calculated 
Report produced for management of time between receipt of customer order 
and shipment to highlight unusual delays 
Record manager’s decisions in 
Qb 
Adjustments to AR and Sales Adjustment recorded by authorized employee, 
properly trained, with password compatibility check 
List of transactions affecting AR and Sales Adjustments automatically 
prepared at end of day for manager’s review 
Decide whether to accept/reject 
customer payment discrepancy 
Manager compares amount of adjustment to total amount billed 
Manager reviews customer’s previous discrepancies for habitual behavior 
 
Each financial operation may be associated with a set of control activities. Let f be a function mapping each financial 
operation to a set of controls in C, then we have for each financial operation Oi: 
 CcandnjcOf jji  ,0},{)(  
 G = a directed graph representing S such that 
 },{ EVG   
where V is the vertex set representing assertions and/or financial operations and E is the edge set representing the 
causal relationships among the vertices. 
A directed graph-based approach captures both the static structure of the system and the propagative relationships 
among the financial operations of the system [Guan and Graham, 1994, 1996; Narayanan and Viswanhadam, 1987; 
Warfield, 1974]. Let },...,{ 1 OAxxxX in   be a set of assertions and financial operations (hereafter referred 
to as nodes) in an internal control system. Then a propagation relationship Ψ can be defined on X such that ji xx   
means that nodes ix and jx are related or an error in ix  can propagate to jx . A propagation digraph G is then 
used to represent this relation as 
},{ EVG   
where }{ XxxV ii  is the vertex set; 
and }),{( jiandrelatedarexandxxxE jiji   is the edge set. 
Figure 1 is a simple example of an internal control system, representing the revenue cycle of an actual business in a 
Midwest city in U.S. Each node in the figure represents either a financial statement assertion or a financial operation 
of the system and is labeled by a number for ease of discussion. Given the definitions of the structure of the system 
above we have: 
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A  = {Sales, Cost of Sales, Inventory, Accounts Receivable, Cash, Loan Payable, Sales Adjustment, Bank Service 
Charge} 
C  = Internal Controls (See Table 1 for the list of controls for each of the financial operations in the internal control 
system.) 
O  = Financial Operations (See Table 1 for a list of the financial operations in the internal control system.) 
 
Receive 
customer 
purchase 
orders & 
prepare job 
requirements 
for operations & 
trucking(1)
If this is a 
custom job, 
create an 
internal manual 
packing list (4)
Weigh 
trucks when 
full (5)
Send 
weights to 
clerk (9)
Weigh 
trucks when 
empty (2)
If this is 
a 
custom 
job, 
create 
more 
detailed 
priced 
packing 
list (6)
Create Bill 
of Lading 
for all jobs 
(12)
Create invoice 
in QuickBooks 
(QB). “Big Co.” 
is invoiced at 
only 90% of 
contract (8)
Receive final 
output melt 
weight from 
“Big Co.” & 
record 
adjustment in 
QB (11)
Decide whether 
to accept/ reject 
customer 
payment 
discrepancy 
(14)
Access secure 
bank website 
for list of 
customer 
remittance 
payments 
received. 
Record in QB 
to reduce bank 
loan and 
customer AR. 
Report any 
non-customer 
remittance to 
bank, to be 
treated as 
cash, and 
report customer 
payment 
discrepancies 
to manager (7)
Send to the 
bank any 
customer 
remittance 
payments 
erroneously 
sent directly to 
the company 
(3)
Receive 
monthly bank 
statement, 
reconcile & 
record 
adjustments in 
QB (10)
Record 
manager’s 
decisions in QB 
(13)
Sales 
(15)
Bank 
Service 
Charge
(22)
Loan 
Pay-
able 
(20)
Cash 
(19)
Accounts 
Receivable 
(AR) (18)
Inven-
tory (17)
Cost of 
Sales 
(16)
Sales 
Adjust-
ment 
(21)
 
Figure 1. A Simple Financial Reporting System 
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Let ][ ijmM  be the adjacency matrix representing the internal control system digraph such that 
 },{1 jiij xxifm  and  },{0 jiij xxifm . If there is a path in G from ix  to jx , jx  is said to be 
reachable from ix . In the context of an internal control system, this means that an error/risk occurring at ix  may 
propagate to jx . For completeness, every vertex in G is defined to be reachable from itself by a path of 0. As 
defined above reachability is transitive. 
The proposed model captures the key elements (financial statement assertions and financial operations) and their 
relationships in an internal control system. The model also allows heuristic knowledge, since corporate personnel 
and external auditors often use past experience in forming judgments and opinions about the tasks they are 
performing. Errors/risks in internal control systems can propagate through the system if not detected. The challenge 
is finding out from which one of the many sources the errors/risks may have propagated. For any financial operation 
x, the error may have propagated from any of the nodes upstream. These nodes are called the ancestors of x. In 
some cases there may be several immediate ancestors of x and the error could have propagated from any of these 
ancestors or any of the error/risk propagation paths headed by these ancestors. Obviously an error may be more 
likely to propagate from some of the nodes than others. This information can be captured through a propagation 
probability. Associated with each edge then is pij, the probability that an error/risk will propagate from xi to xj, 0< pij  
1. It is assumed that this information is available from auditors experienced with the internal control system and can 
be refined by the auditors’ tests of controls. This assumption is based on the requirement that auditors assess all 
components of the risk that a material misstatement in assertions occur and not be prevented or detected by the 
company’s procedures. “These components of audit risk may be assessed in quantitative terms, such as 
percentages, or in nonquantitative terms, such as high, medium, or low risk. The way the auditor should consider 
these component risks and combines them involves professional judgment and depends on the auditor’s approach 
or methodology” (Aud Sec 312, AICPA Codification of Auditing Standards, 2010). The requirements further state that 
the auditor must have sufficient evidence of his/her evaluation of these risks through understanding and testing the 
controls. Thus obtaining the probabilities for this model does not require significant additional work beyond existing 
auditing regulations. 
In case such information is not available, equal probability can be assigned to each pij and pij can be gradually 
refined through working with the internal control system. Also for each node xj, pij is defined such that 
 


k
i
ijp
1
1 
where k is the indegree of the vertex representing the node xj. For example, Figure 2 (from an expenditure cycle) 
shows propagation probabilities for propagation paths into the node Match 3 Documents & Record Payable(4). In 
this case if node 4 is found to contain an error, then the error most likely has propagated from node 3, i.e., Receive 
& Record Invoice. When the model is first implemented, there may not be knowledge about the propagation 
probabilities. In that case, equal probability is assigned to each pij. Guan and Graham [1996] have shown an 
approach to updating the probabilities pij based on results of testing using stochastic approximation-based methods 
[Saridis, 1977]. 
Prepare 
Purchase 
Order
(1)
Receive Goods &
Prepare Receiving
Report
(2)
Receive
& Record
Invoice
(3)
Match 3
Documents &
Record Payable
(4)
P1,4=0.2 P2,4=0.3 P3,4=0.5
 
Figure 2. Error Propagation Probability 
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The adjacency matrix for the example system is given as follows: 





































































1000000000000000000000
0100000000000000000000
0010000000000000000000
0001000000000000000000
0000100000000000000000
0000010000000000000000
0000001000000000000000
0000000100000000000000
0000000011000000000000
0100100001001000000000
0000000000100010000000
0100100000010000000000
1001000000001000000000
0000000000100100100000
0000111100010010000000
0011100010001001000000
0000000000000010100000
0000000000000100010000
0000000000000000101000
0000000000000001000100
0000000000000000010010
0000000000000000001011
M
 
The reachability matrix R is defined as follows: 
 
21 )()()(   rrr IMIMIMR  
where I is the identity matrix, r is an integer, (M+I)
r
 is the r
th
 power of (M+I), and the operations are boolean. The 
reachability matrix R for the digraph in Figure 1 is calculated as follows: 





































































1000000000000000000000
0100000000000000000000
0010000000000000000000
0001000000000000000000
0000100000000000000000
0000010000000000000000
0000001000000000000000
0000000100000000000000
1100100011000000000000
0100100001001000000000
0100111100110010000000
0100100000010000000000
1001000000001000000000
0100111100110110100000
0100111100010010000000
1111100011001001000000
0100111100010010100000
0100111100010110110000
0100111100010010101000
1111100011001001000100
0100111100110110110010
0100111100110110111011
R
 
The reachability matrix as defined above can be processed to extract important properties of the matrix [Narayanan 
and Viswanhadam, 1987; Warfield, 1974]. Two partitions or operations defined on the reachability matrix R are the 
level partition and the separate parts partition. Let )( ixRS , the reachability set, be the set of vertices reachable from 
ix and )( ixAS , the antecedent set, be the set of vertices which reach ix . In other words )( ixRS  refers to the set 
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of financial operations and/or assertions that node xi can affect and )( ixAS refers to the set of financial operations 
that can affect xi. Then the level partition )(RL  is defined as 
 ];...;;[)( 21 lLLLL R  
where l is the number of levels. If the 0
th
 level is defined as the empty set, L0=, the level partition of R can be found 
iteratively as follows 
            niandljxASxRSxRSLLLxL ijijijjjj ,1,1)},()()(...{ 110  R  
The levels so obtained have the following properties: 
 a) liforVLi ,1,    
 b) jiforLL ji     
 c) Edges leaving vertices in level Li can go only to vertices in levels Lj such that ij. In other words, an error 
in nodes in one level can impact only nodes in the same or lower levels. Please note lower-numbered 
levels appear in the lower parts of the level partition drawing (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Level Partitioned Digraph of the Financial Reporting System 
  
72 
Volume 31 Article 3 
Level partitioning can be performed through tabulation. See [Rao, 1984] for an efficient algorithm of level 
partitioning. Tables 2–9 show the process of deriving the eight level partitions for the example in Figure 1. Therefore, 
we have the following level partitions: 
 )}1(),2(),5(),9,4,3(),12,7,6(),14,8(),13,11,10(),22,21,20,19,18,17,16,15{(L  
and 
 }22,21,20,19,18,17,16,15{1 L  
 }13,11,10{2 L  
 }14,8{3 L  
 }12,7,6{4 L  
 }9,4,3{5 L  
 }5{6 L  
 }2{7 L  
 }1{8 L  
For example, in Table 3 the level partition 2L consists of the nodes 10, 11, and 13, as those nodes meet the 
condition that their reachability set is equal to the intersection of the reachability set and the antecedent set. The 
level partitioned digraph is given in Figure 3. 
Table 2: Level Partition 1
 
ix  )( ixRS  )( ixAS  )()( ii xASxRS   
1 1,2,4,5,6,8,9,11,12,15,16,17,18,21 1 1 
2 2,5,6,8,9,11,12,15,16,17,18,21 1,2 2 
3 3,7,10,13,14,18,19,20,21,22 3 3 
4 4,6,8,11,15,16,17,18,21 1,4 4 
5 5,6,8,9,11,15,16,17,18,21 1,2,5 5 
6 6,8,11,15,16,17,18,21 1,2,4,5,6,9 6 
7 7,10,13,14,18,19,20,21,22 3,7 7 
8 8,11,15,16,17,18,21 1,2,4,5,6,8 8 
9 9,6,8,11,12,15,16,17,18,21 1,2,5,9 9 
10 10,19,22 3,7,10 10 
11 11,18,21 1,2,4,5,6,8,9,11 11 
12 12,8,11,15,16,17,18,21 1,2,9,12 12 
13 13,18,21 3,9,13 13 
14 14,10,13,18,21,22 3,7,14 14 
15 15 1,2,4,5,6,8,9,12,15 15 
16 16 1,2,4,5,6,8,9,12,16 16 
17 17 1,2,4,5,6,8,9,12,17 17 
18 18 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,11,12,13,14,18 18 
19 19 3,9,10,19 19 
20 20 3,7,20 20 
21 21 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,11,12,13,14,21 21 
22 22 3,7,10,14,22 22 
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Table 3: Level Partition 2
 
ix  )( ixRS  )( ixAS  )()( ii xASxRS   
1 1,2,4,5,6,8,9,11,12 1 1 
2 2,5,6,8,9,11,12 1,2 2 
3 3,7,10,13,14 3 3 
4 4,6,8,11 1,4 4 
5 5,6,8,9,11 1,2,5 5 
6 6,8,11 1,2,4,5,6,9 6 
7 7,10,13,14 3,7 7 
8 8,11 1,2,4,5,6,8 8 
9 9,6,8,11,12 1,2,5,9 9 
10 10 3,7,10 10 
11 11 1,2,4,5,6,8,9,11 11 
12 12,8,11 1,2,9,12 12 
13 13 3,9,13 13 
14 14,10,13 3,7,14 14 
 
Table 4: Level Partition 3
 
ix  )( ixRS  )( ixAS  )()( ii xASxRS   
1 1,2,4,5,6,8,9,12 1 1 
2 2,5,6,8,9,12 1,2 2 
3 3,7,14 3 3 
4 4,6,8 1,4 4 
5 5,6,8,9 1,2,5 5 
6 6,8 1,2,4,5,6,9 6 
7 7,14 3,7 7 
8 8 1,2,4,5,6,8 8 
9 9,6,8,12 1,2,5,9 9 
12 12,8 1,2,9,12 12 
14 14 3,7,14 14 
 
Table 5: Level Partition 4
 
ix  )( ixRS  )( ixAS  )()( ii xASxRS   
1 1,2,4,5,6,9,12 1 1 
2 2,5,6,9,12 1,2 2 
3 3,7 3 3 
4 4,6 1,4 4 
5 5,6,9 1,2,5 5 
6 6 1,2,4,5,6,9 6 
7 7 3,7 7 
9 9,6,12 1,2,5,9 9 
12 12 1,2,9,12 12 
 
Table 6: Level Partition 5
 
ix  )( ixRS  )( ixAS  )()( ii xASxRS   
1 1,2,4,5,9 1 1 
2 2,5,9 1,2 2 
3 3 3 3 
4 4 1,4 4 
5 5,9 1,2,5 5 
9 9 1,2,5,9 9 
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Table 7: Level Partition 6 
ix  
)( ixRS  
)( ixAS  
)()( ii xASxRS   
1 1,2,5 1 1 
2 2,5 1,2 2 
5 5 1,2,5 5 
 
Table 8: Level Partition 7 
ix  
)( ixRS  
)( ixAS  
)()( ii xASxRS   
1 1,2 1 1 
2 2 1,2 2 
 
Table 9: Level Partition 8 
ix  
)( ixRS  
)( ixAS  
)()( ii xASxRS   
1 1 1 1 
Another partition is defined for the digraph that can help with the error tracing process, i.e., the separate parts 
partition [Warfield, 1974]. It is possible that some of the nodes of G (the digraph representing the internal control 
system) constitute a smaller digraph which is disjoint from the remainder of the digraph. The separate parts partition 
is used to identify these disjoint parts of the internal control system. To define the separate parts partition, a set of 
bottom-level nodes must be defined. B is a set of bottom-level nodes, if and only if, for any xi  B 
)()()( iii xASxRSxAS   
 Given the reachability matrix R as defined above, a separate parts partition SP(R) can be defined as 
];...;;[)( 21 mDDDSP R  
where m is the number of disjoint digraphs which constitute the digraph M represents. To find SP(R), the set of 
bottom-level nodes B must be found, where 
 )}(()({ iiii xASxRSxASxB  R  
Then, any two nodes xi, xj  B are placed in the same block if and only if 
][)]xRS()x[RS( ji  .
Once the nodes of B have been assigned to blocks, the remaining nodes of 
the reachability sets for each block are appended to the block. 
Assessing Impact of Risk 
Once corporate personnel or external auditors have modeled the internal control system as described above, they 
can establish procedures to assist them in evaluating the internal control system and/or performing auditing tasks. 
This section presents and discusses an algorithm to support the requirement to identify the principal exposures and 
the controls designed to reduce those exposures. The elements of the internal control system model follow from the 
risk-management decisions, which are the sole responsibility of corporate management, after a cost-benefit analysis 
of the likelihood and materiality of individual risks. Auditors, in turn, can use this model in their responsibility to 
assess risks and to plan the audit accordingly. The inputs to the algorithm are the adjacency matrix M representing 
the digraph G and the set of nodes F that are assumed/known to be risky. The output of the algorithm is a set of 
nodes, },,,,{ 321 lxxxx  , that are likely to be affected by the identified risks, where l is the number of level 
partitions. 
1. Compute the reachability matrix M of G. 
2. Compute the level-partition of G. 
3. Compute the separate-parts partition of G. 
4. For each separate part 
a. find the impact set })({ FxxRSQ ii   
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b. find the leveled impact set }{ QLQLQLQ ii   for i = 1, l, where l is the number of level partitions. 
The final output Ω is the collection of all the leveled impact sets in all the partitions. Steps 1 through 3 preprocess 
the digraph representing the internal control system by finding the reachability matrix, level partitions, and separate 
parts partitions. Step 4.a finds the impact set in each partition. An impact set is defined as the nodes that may be 
impacted by the risky nodes(s) identified in each separate part partition. It follows that these are the nodes in the 
reachability set(s) of the risky nodes. Step 4.b divides each impact set into levels using level partitions. This helps 
distinguish nodes that are more likely to be impacted from those that are less likely to be impacted. Nodes in a 
higher level partition are more likely to be affected or more immediately affected by the risky nodes because of their 
closer proximity to the risky nodes. 
For example, assume that management (or its auditor) wants to assess the impact of an error in operation 3 (Send 
to the bank any customer remittance payments erroneously sent directly to the company). Maybe the clerk at the 
company did not realize that this was a customer remittance payment, and thought it was a payment for something 
else. The next step, operation 7, will be missing that customer payment from the bank’s list of customer remittance 
payments received. This will cause misstatements in the assertions of Accounts Receivable (AR), Cash, and Loan 
Payable. This algorithm will demonstrate the full impact of the risk in operation 3. In addition, it will show the auditor 
which operation(s) will be most immediately impacted, i.e., operation 7 or Record in QuickBooks the effect on AR, 
Cash, and Loan Payable based on the bank’s remittance list. 
Risk Identification by Company Personnel, and by Auditors During Audit Planning and 
Substantive Testing 
This section presents and discusses algorithms for error diagnosis. Here error diagnosis refers to the process of 
locating the source(s) of observed misstatements in assertions. The purpose of internal auditing includes the 
improvement of the organization’s operations, especially by evaluating the effectiveness of risk management and 
control. Thus internal auditors could use this tool to trace and repair the control problem(s) that triggered the 
misstatement. External auditors, upon finding an error during substantive testing, might merely propose an 
adjustment to the financial statements. But if they had a tool like this available, they, too, may trace the error to a 
significant control deficiency which would require prompt reporting to the Board of Directors. Error diagnosis is a 
fairly well-established field in applied artificial intelligence [Guan and Graham, 1994, 1996; Narayanan and 
Viswanhadam, 1987; Pauker, Clancey, and Shortliffe, 1976; Reggia, Nau, and Wang, 1983; Reiter, 1987]. However, 
researchers have produced relatively little in the domain of internal controls to help locate sources of errors. The 
algorithms in this section have been adapted from Guan and Graham [1994]. 
The algorithms help auditors navigate the internal control system to locate those financial operations that likely 
caused the observed errors/misstatements. The results will provide necessary evidence to support management and 
the external auditor’s assessments of the corporation’s attainment of risk management. The inputs to the algorithms 
are the adjacency matrix M representing the internal control system digraph G and the set of assertion nodes F that 
the auditor assumes/knows to be erroneous. The output of the algorithm is a set of financial operations, Ω, that are 
the likely root cause(s) of the observed errors. Since more than one financial operation in the internal control system 
may have caused the observed errors, this article will consider both the single error case and the multiple error case. 
In the single error case, one financial operation (unreliable ancestor) has likely led to the observed misstatements. In 
the multi-error case, two or more financial operations (independent unreliable ancestors) have led to the observed 
misstatements. In either case the following calculations are performed. Please note that these are one-time 
operations that need be repeated only if there were changes in the underlying financial operations. 
Compute the reachability matrix R of G. 
Compute the level-partition of G. 
Compute the separate-parts partition of G. 
The inputs to the single error algorithm are as follows: 
 The adjacency matrix M representing the digraph G. 
 The reachability matrix R of G. 
 The level-partition L of G. 
 The separate-parts partition of G. 
 The set of observed errors, such as misstated assertions, F, in the internal control system. 
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The output of the algorithm is a set of nodes, Ω, that are likely causes of the observed misstatements. The 
diagnostic process starts when misstatements are observed. If there is one or more common ancestor(s) to the 
misstatements, the single error algorithm is invoked. If there is no common ancestor to the misstatements, the multi-
error algorithm is invoked. If the number of separate parts is greater than 1, then ancestors of the misstatements are 
computed for each separate part and the single error or multi-error algorithm is invoked according to whether there 
is at least one common ancestor or not. The single error algorithm is as follows: 
1. ∑ =  AS(xi) for xi  F 
2. Ω =  
3. While ∑ <>  
4.         T ={xx  ∑ and level(x) = min{level(xi) for all xi  ∑ }}
1
 
5.         TESTCONTROLS(T) 
6. Return Ω as the error source 
 
where the TESTCONTROLS algorithm is as follows: 
 TESTCONTROLS(T) 
1. If T = 1 
2.          v =T 
3. If T > 1 
4.          v  T such that pvz =  
  max{pxz for all x  T and z is the common descendent of all x  T} 
5. If v’s controls have not been tested 
6.          ∑ = ∑ - {v} 
7.          Test the controls associated with node v and mark v as tested 
8.          If the tests reveal control risk to be high  
9.                 Ω = Ω  {v}
2
 
10. If Ancestor(v) <>  
11.          T = Immediate Ancestor(v) 
12. If T <>  
                     TESTCONTROLS(T) 
The logic of this algorithm will help the auditor navigate the complex internal control system to search for a possible 
error source when the misstatements have common ancestors. The assumption is that weak controls of one 
financial operation (node) resulted in the misstatements (they are represented as assertion nodes in F, which is part 
of the input to the algorithm). In auditing the auditor’s job is to identify the weak controls of a financial system 
through testing controls of operations. The algorithms in this section are designed to backtrack through the complex 
internal control system of financial operations so that the auditor can more efficiently utilize this important source of 
knowledge, i.e., the structure of an internal control system [Frederick, 1991]. The diagnosis algorithms guide the 
auditor in choosing a node to test so that the result can reduce the search space maximally and lead the search in 
the most likely error propagation path. 
The algorithm starts by first finding the common ancestors of the misstatements (Step 1). This set of common 
ancestors, ∑, the set of candidate error sources, is defined as the intersection of the ancestors of the misstatement 
nodes in F. The algorithm will then guide the auditor to test the controls of these nodes and/or their ancestors to 
identify error source. The “while” loop (Steps 3–5) examines each of the potential error sources in ∑ starting with the 
one at the lowest level of the level-partitioned digraph. Once the node on the lowest level is identified (Step 4), a 
modified depth-first search algorithm (TESTCONTROLS) guides the auditor by backtracking along all possible error 
propagation paths. In TESTCONTROLS, T contains the set of nodes to examine next. If T contains only one node, 
the controls of this node will be tested (Step 7).
3
 Once the controls of a node are tested and found to be error-free, 
the node is removed from the set of candidate error sources and marked as tested (Steps 6 and 7). If the controls 
test error-free, the error is likely to have originated from nodes further upstream, and the ancestors of the tested 
node will be examined next (Steps 11 and 12). Otherwise the node whose controls have been found to be weak in 
the testing is added to the set of error sources Ω (Step 9). At this point the auditor has the option of stopping the 
diagnostic process or continuing until all the potential error sources are tested. If the search is to continue with the 
parent(s) of the current node, there are two possible cases. In the first case, there is only a single parent, and the 
auditor will test the controls associated with this parent (condition in Step 1). In the second case, there is more than 
                                                     
1
 If there is more than one node at the lowest level in ∑,, one of them is chosen randomly to start the testing process. 
2
 The auditor can stop here once a node has been identified as the likely error source or continue further upstream. 
3
 Please note that when TESTCONTROLS is first invoked from the single error source algorithm, T contains only one node. 
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one parent, and the parent from which the error is most likely to have propagated can be determined according to 
the propagation probabilities. This is done so that the search will stay as closely as possible on the most probable 
path to the source (Step 4). The idea is that a node is chosen for testing so that the test result can prune away at 
least one path of nodes. If the node whose controls have just been tested does not have any parent, then the 
recursive algorithm will allow the testing of the remaining possible error paths [Bang-Jensen and Gutin, 2000]. After 
the examination of all possible paths originating from the chosen node in the main algorithm, the node at the next 
lowest level will be used to guide the next round of testing (Step 4 in the main algorithm). This process continues 
until all potential error sources in ∑ are exhausted or, as noted above, when the auditor determines a node with its 
identified weak controls is sufficient to explain the observed misstatements. 
As an example of a single error source causing the misstatements, let us assume there is an error in weighing the 
trucks when full for a non-custom job (node 5), propagating through nodes 9, 12, and 8, resulting in incorrect 
calculation of the cost of the job, causing errors in assertions 16 (cost of sales) and 17 (inventory) (see Figure 4). As 
a result, misstatements occur in assertions 16 and 17. The candidate error sources ∑, the intersection of the 
ancestors of the misstatements {16, 17}, will be equal to {8,6,12,4,9,5,2,1}. The algorithm would first identify node 8 
as the common ancestor at the lowest level of the partitioned digraph (Step 2). Assume the controls of node 8 prove 
to be strong, resulting in error-free transactions; the error may have propagated from a node further upstream. 
Tracing back from node (operation) 8, auditors would presume, ex ante, that the probability that the error arose in 
node (operation) 12, which applies to all jobs, is higher than the probability that the error arose in node (operation) 6, 
which applies only to custom jobs, given that the auditors knew that the error was related to a non-custom job. If, 
however, the auditors had learned that the clerk who performed operation 6 was inexperienced and likely to create 
prices for all jobs without scrutinizing them for customization, or if the auditors did not have enough evidence to 
determine whether the error source was from a custom job or not, then p6-8 would be greater and p12-8 would be less. 
The auditors’ experience and prior knowledge would determine the probability of each path, as is common in 
practice. Assume that the auditor-assigned probabilities would direct the search along the 8–12 path. First the 
auditor would test to assess whether operation 12 (Create Bill of Lading for all jobs) contained the necessary 
controls as listed in Table 1, whether they were designed properly and operating as designed. Perhaps examples of 
carelessness or unfamiliarity, or even fraud, would occur in that operation. But if Bills of Lading were indeed being 
prepared correctly based on weights received from operation 9, then attention would be directed to operation 9, and 
so on. Eventually, the auditor would find the erroneously processed transaction which caused the misstatement. The 
auditor would then recommend specific preventive controls which should be added to that process. It is quite 
possible, in addition, that this search would have revealed downstream nodes where additional controls could have 
detected the upstream error. 
This article considers two cases for multi-errors. The first case occurs when separate parts partition yields more than 
one disjoint digraph. In this case each of the disjoint digraphs, along with their associated misstatements, can be 
diagnosed with the single error algorithm described above. This type of multi-error scenario can occur when the 
digraph represents multi-cycles in an organization and an auditor ruled out certain propagation paths, resulting in 
disjoint digraphs or disjoint cycles. The second multi-error case occurs when more than one financial operation could 
have propagated errors to all the misstatements in the assertions. The following algorithm addresses this case. As in 
the previous algorithm F represents the set of misstatements, financial assertions, in the internal control system 
suspected/observed to be abnormal and Ω represents the set of financial operations that are likely causes of the 
suspected/observed errors. The input to the algorithm is the same as that for the single error source algorithm. The 
following is the multi-error algorithm. 
1. ∑ = ∪ AS(xi) for xi  F 
2. S =  
3. While ∪x∈SRS(x) ⊂F 
4.        T ={xx  ∑ and level(x) = min{level(xi) for all xi  ∑ }} 
5.        v = a node in T such that |RS(v) ∩F| = maxx∈T(|RS(x)∩F|) 
6.       If (RS(v) ∩F)-( ∪t∈SRS(t))) <> 
7.              S = S  {v} 
8.             ∑ = ∑ - {v} 
9. Ω =  
10. While S <>  
11.         v = the node such that |RS(v)F| = max(|RS(xi)F| for all xi∈S) and  
                    level(v) = min(level(xi) for all xi∈S) 
12.         If v ∈ S, S = S – {v} 
13.         T = {v} 
14.         TESTCONTROLS(T) 
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Figure 4. Example of Single Error/Risk Source 
The objective of the algorithm is to find Ω, a set of financial operations whose collective failure would propagate 
errors to all the known misstatements, F. The algorithm starts by finding ∑, the set of nodes in the digraph whose 
failure can cause all the misstatements/assertions in F (Step 1). Since there is no common ancestor to the 
misstatements, ∑ will be the union of the ancestors of the misstatements in F. Next the algorithm finds S, the 
smallest set of nodes in ∑ whose weak controls could explain all the observed misstatements (Steps 3–8). The 
“while” loop in Steps 3–8 builds the set S. The loop stops when the nodes in S cover all the misstatements in F 
(Step 3). The objective of this step is to reduce the number of nodes to examine for possible error sources. In this 
loop the algorithm adds a node from ∑ to S if this node is at the lowest level and the failure of the node will 
propagate error to most nodes in F that are not already covered by the current nodes in S (Steps 4–5). Once the 
algorithm has added a node is to S in Step 7, it removes it from ∑ (Step 8). This process continues until S contains 
nodes whose collective failure will propagate error to all the assertion nodes in F (condition in line 3). 
The next set of steps directs the auditor to test controls of nodes in S and their ancestors to localize error sources. 
The next node to test is the lowest level node in S that will propagate error to most misstatements in F (Step 11). 
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The same TESTCONTROLS algorithm will help the auditor navigate the part of the internal control system affecting 
this node (Step 14). Upon the examination of a node and its propagation paths, the algorithm removes it from 
further consideration (Step 12). This process is repeated until all the nodes (and their propagation paths) in S are 
tested (condition in Step 10). The set, Ω, returned by the algorithm will contain nodes whose collective failure will 
have propagated the error to all the misstatements in F. 
As an example let us consider an error scenario where multiple error sources exist (see Figure 5). An error in 
calculating the price of a custom job (6) propagated through 8, causing errors in assertions 15 (Sales) and 18 (AR). 
Also, an error occurred in sending to the bank some customer remittance payments erroneously sent directly to the 
company (3) because a newly hired clerk did not know what to do with such checks. Instead, he put them in a 
drawer, intending to ask his supervisor about them when time would permit. This caused an error to propagate 
through operation 7 (the list of customer remittance payments on the bank’s website), misstating assertion 20 (Loan 
Payable) and aggravating the misstatement in assertion 18 (AR). In this scenario the set of misstatements F 
comprises {15, 18, 20}. Because there is no common ancestor to all the nodes in F, the multi-error source algorithm 
will be initiated. The set of potential error sources ∑ will contain all the non-assertion nodes in the digraph except for 
node 10 (Step 1). The next move is to find those nodes (assigned to the set S) in ∑ in the lowest level (Steps 3–7), 
such that the nodes in S can collectively cause the observed misstatements. In the current example, the set S = {7, 
8}. The algorithm next tests the controls of nodes in S. The testing for node 7 will lead the auditor to node 3. The 
testing for node 8 will lead the auditor to node 6 or node 12, depending on the probabilities. In this example, the 
search for poor controls stops at node 3 and node 6, but if node 6 turns out to be error-free, the search will continue 
upstream to the highest level of the digraph. 
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Figure 5. Example of Multiple Error Sources 
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Analysis of the Diagnosis Algorithms 
Design science artifacts need to be validated [Hevner, March, Park, and Ram, 2004]. In addition to validation 
through audit scenarios in an internal control system of a real business described in the last section, this section will 
provide an analytical discussion (such as complexity analysis) of the algorithms [Hevner, March, Park, and Ram, 
2004]. The analysis will be conducted in two parts. The first part will consider the preprocessing steps and the 
second part will examine the algorithms. The construction of the reachability matrix, the separate parts partition, and 
level partition is referred to as preprocessing steps, in that these steps need be performed once in most cases 
unless the underlying financial operations change and/or their propagation relationships change. The complexity of 
reachability matrix construction is generally O(n
3
) where n is the number of nodes in the digraph representing the 
internal control system [Warshall, 1962]. Level-structuring also has a complexity of O(n
3
) [Rao and Viswanadham, 
1987]. For separate parts partition, the determination of the bottom level nodes can be performed in O(n
2
) steps, as 
this step consists of finding the intersection of the reachability set and ancestor set of each node and comparing the 
result with the ancestor set for each node. The assignment of nodes to each block is O(n
3
), since each block 
(separate part) is determined by finding the intersection of each node with all the other nodes. Therefore, the 
preprocessing steps are O(n
3
). 
The risk impact algorithm has a complexity of O(n
2
). Given a set of financial operations the output of the algorithm is 
a set of other financial operations and/or assertions that may be impacted if the first set of financial operations has 
weak controls. After the one-time preprocessing steps described above, Step 4 finds the set of financial operations 
and assertions to be impacted and sorts them by levels so that auditors can see which operations are more 
immediately affected because of their proximity to the operations with weak controls. Step 4.a finds all the 
operations impacted and Step 4.b sorts them. If k is the number of risky operations/nodes, then Step 4.a loops 
through all the k nodes and adds their reachability sets to the result. Since each reachability set has a maximum of 
(n-1) number of nodes (minus one because the risky node itself is excluded), Step 4.a is O(kn). Step 4.b sorts by 
levels the impacted nodes by examining each node in the impact set Q (a O(n-k) operation) and placing it in the 
appropriate leveled impact set. Therefore, the entire Step 4.b is O(ln) where l is the number of levels in the level 
partition. Hence, the risk impact algorithm is O(max(kn, ln)) where k ≤ n and l ≤ n. 
The error source diagnosis algorithms are more involved in terms of complexity analysis. In the single error 
algorithm the first step finds the set of potential error sources or ∑. Again, if the number of misstatements/observed 
errors is k, then this step is O(kn). Step 3 loops through all the nodes in ∑ so that their controls and their ancestors’ 
controls may be tested to locate weak controls, resulting in the observed errors. Therefore, this step will repeat a 
maximum of (n-k) times, i.e., the step is O(n) as the number of potential error sources cannot exceed the number of 
nodes. Step 4 finds the node at the lowest level in ∑ and, therefore, is O(n-k). Step 5 is a call to the 
TESTCONTROLS algorithm, which is a variation of the well-established depth-first search algorithm. Depth-first 
search is O(n+e), where n is the number of nodes and e is the number of edges [Bang–Jensen and Gutin, 2000]. 
Hence, this algorithm is O(n(n+e)) or O(n
2
+ne) in the worst case. 
The multi-error algorithm is more complex than the single error algorithm. As in the single-error algorithm, the first 
step in the multi-error algorithm is finding the potential error sources, a O(kn) operation. Steps 3–8 find the smallest 
set of nodes (S) whose failure or whose ancestors’ failure would explain the observed misstatements. Step 3 checks 
to see if the union of all the reachability sets of the nodes in S covers all the misstatements in F, a O(n) operation. 
Step 4 finds the nodes in ∑ at the lowest level and saves the result in T. This is O(n), as ∑ has a maximum of n-k 
number of nodes. If T contains more than one node, Step 5 selects the node that reaches the most nodes in F. Step 
5 contains two intersections, each a O(n) operation. Since T is usually a small set, we can ignore the number of 
times these intersections are performed in our time complexity analysis. Thus Step 5 is O(n). A similar analysis 
shows that Step 6 is also a O(n) operation and Steps 7 and 8 can be performed in constant time. In the next “while” 
loop Step 10 is O(n), as the number of nodes in S will not exceed (n-k). However, in most cases the number of 
nodes in S is smaller than (n-k), as it represents the smallest number of nodes in the lowest levels that cover the 
error nodes in F. Step 11 finds the lowest level node in S that affects the most nodes in F. The intersection of the 
reachability set of each node in S with those nodes in F is O(n
2
), as the number of operations in this step is at most 
(n-k)*(n-k). The other steps, with the exception of Step 14, can be performed in constant time. Since the loop is O(n), 
Step 11 is O(n
2
), and TESTCONTROLS is O(n+e), the multi-error algorithm is also O(nn
2
+n(n+e)) or O(n
3
+n
2
+ne). 
As the above analysis shows, the algorithms are either O(n
2
) and O(n
3
+n
2
+ne). In other words, these algorithms are 
tractable in terms of their running time. It is important to point out that, although the analysis in this section provides 
a better understanding of the algorithms, auditing is inherently a very interactive process. The main contribution of 
the model is its ability to guide auditors in a very interactive process (auditing) by helping auditors utilize an 
important knowledge source, i.e., the structural attributes of the internal control system, as opposed to just relying on 
experience [Frederick, 1991]. 
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While this model’s advantages may not be obvious for a small system, where an auditor needs to remember only a 
few processes, its value increases with the size and complexity of the company. Figure 6 illustrates how, in a 
moderate or large company, not only are there many data transformation processes within a cycle, but there are key 
inter-cycle information flows as well to processes within the other cycles before being ultimately transformed into 
assertions about the activities and status of the company. With all the interrelationships among the five common 
cycles as depicted in Figure 6, a digraph model incorporating the entire company offers the auditor a much more 
reliable methodology for planning which processes to test and for searching backward for error sources. 
Figure 6 may also serve as an example of when separate parts partition may be used to improve the efficiency of 
the audit process. We might have a case in which an audit team is performing substantive tests on assertions 
affected by the Revenue and the Payroll/HR Cycles, therefore using a digraph with nodes from both cycles. A 
misstatement in the salaries paid to a salesperson might originate from a weakly controlled node in the Payroll/HR 
Cycle, which calculates pay for salespersons based, in part, on salespersons’ commission data received from the 
Revenue Cycle. Alternatively, the misstatement may arise from a weakly controlled node in the Revenue Cycle 
which calculates and sends commissions data based on sales made. 
Payroll / HR Cycle
Expenditure Cycle Production Cycle Revenue Cycle
Financing Cycle
Time & attendance data
Cost of production labor
Salespersons’ commissions earned
Cost of prdn mtrls
Special cust order needs
Special cust order costs
Interest & dividend payments required
ASSERTIONS
Wage & salary costs
Purchases & cash payments
Cost of finished goods manufactured Sales, cash receipts,
 accts rec, cost of goods sold
Bank loans, stock issued,
 investments bought & sold
 
Figure 6. Information Flow Within and Among a Company’s Processing Cycles 
But if the misstatement is in salaries paid to salaried administrative managers rather than salespersons, the 
Revenue Cycle could not possibly be involved. The path from the Revenue Cycle to the Payroll/HR Cycle may be 
ruled out, and the Payroll/HR Cycle can be examined as a disjoint digraph with no physical connections to other 
cycles. This is where separate parts partition can be used to break the digraph into two separate disjoint digraphs so 
auditors have to navigate only a much smaller set of nodes. 
Auditors’ Use of Tests of Controls to Plan Substantive Testing 
The previous sections followed an error or vulnerability in an assertion back to its source in a weakness in a control 
over a financial operation. This is useful first in the planning phase of the audit, where the auditor’s objective is to 
design an efficient and effective set of tests of controls to focus on those key controls most essential to mitigating a 
material misstatement in an assertion. This algorithm quickly guides the auditor from an assertion judged particularly 
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material or risky back through the chain of operations and controls affecting it for more thorough testing. 
Furthermore, it is useful for actual errors discovered much later in the audit during the detailed substantive testing of 
the account balances, to find the control flaw which allowed that error to occur and not be detected. The auditor has 
a responsibility to disclose control weaknesses that need fortification. 
However, with external auditors now required to assess controls prior to substantive testing of the assertions in all 
audits, this model’s greatest economic value may be in the other direction, with its explicit connection starting from 
the controls surrounding financial operations and progressing to the assertions affected by those operations. 
Between the planning phase and the substantive testing phase, auditors perform actual tests of controls. After 
evaluating the results of these tests, auditors assign control risk more precisely to specific financial operations. 
Using this algorithm, auditors can quickly trace any financial operation to the affected assertion(s) in order to refine 
the audit plan to make it even more efficient and effective. Auditors will reallocate budgeted time toward those 
assertions affected by weaker controls and away from those at the end of a path of the more reliable controls. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This article introduces a graph-based model of internal control systems that focuses on the structural aspects of the 
system rather than the probabilistic and heuristic aspects. The proposed model can be used to support risk 
management, risk assessment, and audit tasks such as error diagnosis. The proposed model captures the structure 
of an internal control system and the propagative relationships among its structural elements. The article presents 
and discusses two types of algorithms based on the model to help company personnel manage risk and auditors 
assess risk and trace sources of errors. The use of knowledge of the structure of an internal control system is 
important as managers and auditors rely not only on experience and heuristic knowledge, they rely also on more 
structured knowledge of the transaction processing systems. The model is based on a simple conceptualization of 
the internal control system. It is simpler to implement and easier to maintain than the existing models [Bailey, Duke, 
Gerlach, Ko, Meservy, and Whinston,1985; Krishnan, Peters, Padman, and Kaplan, 2005; Wand and Weber, 1989]. 
Though the model has been presented as a tool for managers and auditors in evaluating the internal control system 
or in substantive testing, it may also serve as a possible solution to automate all or parts of error detection and 
analysis in auditing, especially in light of the need for fast and constant monitoring of financial systems/control 
systems in continuous auditing [Chou, Du, and Lai, 2007]. 
The digraph model presented in this article offers a simple yet workable approach to help auditors perform their 
tasks in this difficult environment of increasing auditing requirements and limited resources. The natural next step in 
this research is to validate the model through its implementation in both internal and external audit engagements. 
Since each company’s accounting information systems and business processes are different, validation of the 
model’s usefulness will have to be established within a company and compared against a similar audit in the same 
company without the model. Another promising direction for further research is incorporating a model like this into 
continuous auditing. As companies start to publish financial information in almost real time, the need to assure the 
reliability of such information is becoming more pressing. Continuous auditing is the use of automated tools to 
monitor internal controls. The model presented in this article may be implemented relatively simply, as it is merely a 
different representation of documentation that auditors already routinely accumulate. 
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